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PERCEIVING AND KNOWING AS ACTIVITIES 
Abstract. According to the tradition of most empiricists, perception is the basis for all our 
knowledge (at least of the world).  The tradition also assumes that perception by humans is 
a passive activity resulting in some static states pertaining perception and belief, which are then, in 
some versions, modified by the mind before being passed onto memory and knowledge. Following 
the work of J. J. Gibson, we argue that perceiving involves many activities and actions.  This is 
true of both visual as well as olfactory-taste perception. The main moral of this paper is that 
perceiving and knowing are best thought of not as involving static states, but rather as ongoing 
temporal activities involving change. This presumably means giving up a frozen ontology of states 
and moving towards something like a dynamic ontology as a basis.
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Introduction 
First, a note: The title uses “activities” rather than “action”, since “action” in its 
most usual philosophical use entails intentional behavior. 
According to the tradition of most empiricists, perception is the basis for all our 
knowledge (at least of the external world).  The tradition also assumes that 
perception by humans is a passive activity resulting in some static perceptual or 
belief states that then, on some versions, the mind modifies before passing the 
content onto memory and knowledge. 
Following the work of J. J. Gibson, we argue that perceiving involves many 
activities and actions. This is true both of visual and of olfactory-taste 
perception. 
More unusually, we also argue that knowing is an activity, again in many ways. 
(This follows a line of argument used by John Dewey, the American 
Pragmatist). Clearly, coming to know something (learning) involves many 
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activities. Moreover, knowing itself is not just a static state or memory engram. 
Knowing is being able to draw inferences, solve problems and demonstrate the 
knowledge. Moreover, memory recall itself is most often a constructive activity 
(sometimes quite fanciful as in confabulation). 
So the main moral in this paper is that perceiving and knowing are best thought 
about not as relations involving static states, but rather as ongoing temporal 
activities involving changes.   
This presumably means giving up an ontology of static states and moving 
towards something like a dynamic ontology as basic.   
1. Perceiving
We discuss three broad ways in which activity is involved in perception, using 
examples from visual and taste perception for each. We then discuss how the 
involvement of activity suggests that a dynamic picture of perception is more 
appropriate than static one. This dynamic theory derives in large part from the 
work of the psychologist J. J. Gibson (1904–1979).In emphasizing this active 
nature we do not mean to imply that all perception is perception for action. We 
enjoy as much as anybody reclining on a beach at sunset, sipping dark rum and 
lime juice while visually basking in the beauty of the moment.  What we do wish 
to emphasize is that before Gibson, most if not all, work in perception dealt with 
object recognition which implies that only objects and their properties are 
important. This is probably a hangover from a substantialist ontological 
prejudice and it is this general position we wish to combat and argue against. 
1.1. Activity structures perception (telos) 
One of J. J. Gibson’s (and the pragmatists that preceded him) key insights was 
that much of perception is preparation for action. Or in a slogan: Perceiving for 
a purpose (goal directed perception). Now this “for action” could mean many 
different things, and has meant many different things for different thinkers. So 
before getting to our examples, we will take a brief detour to discuss some of the 
things philosophers have meant by it. We will briefly touch on some of 
the controversies, abstaining from taking a position on these debates for the time 
being.  
The least controversial version of the claim is probably this: a perceptual 
system’s adaptive success – the reason it was naturally selected – is linked to 
how successfully it guided an organism’s behavior in the environment in which 
an organism evolved. This is compatible with many diverse theories of 
perception. It is an informative claim to the extent that some philosophers, and, 
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once upon a time, some psychologists, were inclined to treat perception in more 
intellectual and theoretical terms, rather than as a practical ability. That is, 
perception was taken to be a way of knowing (propositionally) about worldly 
objects and properties and their relationships to each other. The history of the 
philosophy of perception is tightly wound with the histories of epistemology and 
ontology. Both a cause and a consequence has been a sort of dualist assumption 
about the relationship between the mind and the world. The passive mind 
receives inputs from the world. The mind then transforms these inputs to greater 
or lesser degrees (depending on which philosopher you’re asking) producing the 
mental representations of the world we have in perception (this position is often 
called “Constructivism”). The interface between the mind and the visual world is 
the eye, or more specifically, the retina. The world as projected onto the retina 
is not the world we perceive. So it’s generally thought that the mind fills in the 
gaps, drawing a boundary between the world as we perceive it and the world as 
it really is, thus creating an epistemological puzzle about how perception can 
give us knowledge of the external world (if indeed it does). On this picture, the 
retina is like a camera film and the mind a sort of screen editor that interprets 
and adjusts shapes and colors of the film from the retina, and the resulting image 
constitutes the mind’s access to the world. 
The fairly uncontroversial insight that served to reorient our thinking about 
perception is that often perception is for action in that ultimately we perceive 
what and how we do because this helps us survive and reproduce in the 
environments in which our species evolved .The epistemological question: “is 
the world we perceive the way the world really is?” or, in other words, “what 
is the direct object of perception?” can come apart from the independently 
interesting metaphysical and empirical question: “what are the senses and 
perception good for – what do they do? How do they help creatures like this to 
survive in an environment like that?” or “the creature is surviving, so what’s it 
doing such that the way it perceives is working so well for it?”  Starting with the 
second question has led many psychologists and philosophers to better 
appreciate the importance of the organism’s activity (the “enactive” component), 
of its body (the embodied component), and of its environment (the embedded 
component) to understanding perception and cognition both in human and non-
human animals.1
1 While these questions are conceptually distinct, many philosophers (and psychologists for that 
matter) still take them together, and they can certainly constrain one another (the epistemology of 
perception should respect the best science, but the plausibility of some of the theoretical 
assumptions or consequences of the science of perception depends on how sound they turn out to 
be in the realm of epistemology), Gibson, as well as many if not most of his followers, was 
a direct-realist, and this was an explicit part of his program. But as we explain, it’s possible to be 
an indirect realist or even a transcendental idealist and take on board much of the enactive, 
embodied, embedded program. 
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It should be noted that this fairly uncontroversial insight is compatible even with 
representationalism, which Gibson, who denied representations, and many 
contemporary neo-Gibsonians and similar embodied, embedded, enactive, and 
extended views, would consider in opposition with his program.2 It’s compatible 
insofar as biological function, which is understood essentially as we have 
defined the uncontroversial version of the claim that perception is for action 
above, plays a constitutive role in a number of representational accounts (e.g. 
Dretske, Papineau, Millikan, & O’Shea).3
One place controversy turns up is in the implications of perception being for 
action. For instance, a representationlist might argue that all we perceive are 
properties, but the properties we represent are represented because of their 
biological usefulness for action. It would thus be open to one to maintain the 
dualism between mind and world. Perception is for action, but the information 
perception delivers to guide action is impoverished and requires interpolation by 
mental processes. Alternatively, a Gibsonian might argue that perception 
(perceptual content, where this need not imply representations) is much thicker. 
That in perception already – not just when cognition has come into play – we are 
presented immediately with practically relevant information, such as the 
functional significance of things in the environment and the opportunities for 
behavior that they allow, or what Gibson termed “affordances.” Perception 
needs to tell us what’s dangerous, what’s food, what’s a mate, where one might 
hide, etc. and there may be resources in an organism’s environment (including 
other organisms) that directly inform the organism of these facts.  
Even if one does not go in for the direct perception of affordances, taking 
seriously the idea that perception is for action introduces some constraints on 
one’s theory of perception. For instance, if we perceive so that we may react to 
a predator, then perception had better be fast enough for the organism, typically, 
to avoid being killed. So, inefficient, time consuming processing cannot be 
what’s involved in initiating action to avoid a predator or other impending 
danger, as demonstrated by time to collision experiments where various species 
of animals demonstrated avoidance behavior when faced with an apparently 
impending impact from an approaching object.4 There cannot, for instance, be 
something like a deliberative, practical inference taking place (that’s not to say 
there may not be something very fast and inference-like occurring, but it must be 
able to work very quickly), because cognitive processing would seemingly take 
2 For review and defense of embodied, embedded, enactive and extended views, see WARD and 
STAPLETON [2012].
3 See e.g. DRETSKE [1995] and [1988], PAPINEAU [1984], [1987] and [1993], MILLIKAN 
[1984], [1989a] and [1989 b] and O’SHEA [2013].
4 SCHIFF [1965].
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too much time. Further, the visual systems in simple creatures are capable of 
using this information – of moving directly from the perception of the world to 
an appropriate activity with respect to it – but it is doubtful that they are 
performing inferences. Similarly, it cannot be that in order to perceive a predator 
or danger, or to perceive something as dangerous, e.g. infants and the visual 
cliff, and Schiff collision avoidance experiments5, one must first have some 
higher-level conceptual understanding of what a predator is, since presumably 
infants, sheep and bunnies, for instance, lack such concepts, but are able to 
dodge predators when the need arrives, presumably on the basis of their 
perceiving them. Where perceptual systems can quickly, reliably, and directly 
tell the organism how to react appropriately in its environment, there’s reason to 
think they will do so – that in some cases they have been adapted to do so. So we 
think the fact that perception is for action (activity) provides a heuristic for 
theorizing about perception: perceptual systems and perceptual content have 
a very tight relationship to activity, and with respect to that relationship, 
evolution favors efficiency and economy. This doesn’t yet provide an answer to 
exactly what the relationship is (e.g. causal vs. constitutive), but provides what 
we consider an underappreciated constraint (though not by all, arguably 
Millikan’s pushmi-pullyu representations were inspired in part by such 
considerations) which may help decide some conflicts.6
We will now provide a few fairly straightforward examples of ways in which 
perception is for action, again, focusing on vision and gustation.  
One of the functions of vision is to let us know how to respond appropriately, 
e.g. to food, predators, mates, obstacles to our movement, and other objects that 
we may be desiring or avoiding. This appears to be a function of foveal vision. 
Foveal (as opposed to peripheral) vision has high acuity and so provides 
information needed to identify specific objects by e.g. color, and shape. When 
we need to identify an object, to see what kind of object it is, we actively bring it 
into focus by foveating on it. We, usually, identify objects, of course, so that we 
may do (the appropriate) things with them – this is presumably the raison d’etre
of our recognitional capacities. For instance, we perceive their shapes and 
distances from us so that we may know if and how we may grasp them – i.e. 
what size to make our grip aperture and how to grip the object (if it is slippery 
we will grasp it one way, if it is rough or prickly, quite another. Of course, 
tactile perception also plays an important role here, but we shall continue to 
focus on vision). Alternatively, we perceive and identify objects so that we may 
plan actions involving them. 
5 On visual cliff, see: GIBSON, PICK [2000] and GIBSPON, WALK, TIGHE [1957]. On time to 
collision see: SCHIFF, DETWILER [1979] and GIBSON [1969].
6 MILLIKAN [1996]. 
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6 MILLIKAN [1996]. 
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Peripheral vision, in contrast, doesn’t tell us much (though not nothing) about 
what objects are where in our environment; it is very low in acuity and 
achromatic. But it does detect motion and, thus, change. Peripheral vision tells 
us e.g. when something is approaching us, or when something small has 
scampered by. Peripheral vision tells us when to turn our heads so that we may 
foveate on and identify what is coming our way and what has dashed by. So 
peripheral vision directly informs activity in the form of head and body 
movement, movement in the direction of an object on which we will foveate, in 
order to identify, so that we may act on or respond to it appropriately.  
Turning now to gustation: thinking of gustation (that is, the taste and flavor 
sensory system) in terms of its ecological (and thus social and biological) 
function has implications for how one takes the gustatory system to be 
organized. If one thinks of gustatory perception in terms of the reception of 
information from the environment, specifically from certain chemicals in the 
environment, one might be inclined to consider taste only in terms of certain 
receptors, that is, sites sensitive to select stimuli. In fact, this is commonly done 
by psychologists, who identify our sense of taste with the receptors on the 
tongue and the roof of the mouth.7
In contrast, if you think of the sense of taste in terms of the biological and social 
functions of selecting food that is healthy for consuming (non-poisonous and 
nutritious) or socially significant, and follow Gibson in considering the sense of 
taste as a perceptual system, there’s compelling reason to move beyond the 
tongue and roof of the mouth. In addition to these organs, the nose (for 
retronasal olfaction) and the trigeminal nerve (for somatosensation) play crucial 
roles in flavor perception. While the tongue is in part responsible for the 
sensation of sweetness, saltiness, bitterness, and sourness, retronasal olfaction is 
responsible for most of the flavor experiences we identify, e.g. vanilla, 
chocolate, coffee, etc. And somatosensation (both in the nose and in the mouth) 
is responsible for the sensation of viscosity (as from fat – e.g. cream and butter), 
spiciness (jalapeño), and mint flavor. Retronasal olfaction can also influence 
how sweet or sour something tastes, as can temperature.8 And in addition to 
somatosensation, audition plays a role in texture sensation e.g. crunchiness
– indeed, potato chip companies select noisy, crinkly materials for bags so that
the chips will seem fresher.9 The sound carries information about whether or not 
it should be eaten – if something is stale, for instance, then it’s probably old and 
may possess dangerous bacteria or fungi. Olfaction tells us a lot about whether 
food has passed the point at which it is safe for consumption.10
7 WOLF, KLUENDER, LEVI [2012],Chapter 15. 
8 See CRUZ, GREEN [2000]. 
9 See e.g. WINTERMANN [2012]. 
10 WOLF, KLUENDER, LEVI [2012]. 
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These different kinds of information work together to tell us about what foods 
we should eat (an activity of biological and social import). And they work 
together not only bypooling their findings, but by actually influencing each other 
– something that smells like vanilla (something with vanilla flavor) will be
perceived as sweeter than something that smells like lettuce (this is the 
phenomenon of “sweetness enhancement?”).11
1.2. Activity in information pickup 
The previous section discussed the teleological or functional role of perception 
with respect to action (activity). The claim was that perception is often for action 
(activity), and that this makes a difference to how we conceive of and theorize 
about perception.  We now move onto a different feature of the relationship 
between perception and activity, namely, the causal or constitutive role of 
activity in the very act of perceiving. To wit, we’ve just discussed ways 
of understanding the fact that we perceive in order to act. We now discuss 
ways in which we are active so that we may perceive.  
As was the case with the teleological or functional role of activity in perception, 
there are more and less controversial ways of understanding the role of activity 
in perception. The less controversial or more traditional way which is 
compatible with the static (eye as a camera) view is to understand the role of 
activity instrumentally.  On this view, one acts so that one may be in a position 
to receive stimuli from the environment, but perception really begins after the 
stimuli have been received. One can thus maintain the kind of dualistic view 
mentioned earlier, and give an instrumental role to activity in perception.  
However, Gibson held that once one appreciates the activity that’s involved in 
perception, the idea that the eye is taking pictures of features in the environment 
that the mind then processes (strings together and interprets) to create 
representations of the external world loses force. This is because as one moves 
around, a great deal of information is revealed in the environment. According to 
Gibson, activity obviates the need to mentally construct a perceptual (e.g. visual) 
scene. One aspect of his critique of traditional psychological theories of 
perception dealt with their experimental designs. In order to make perception 
something that could be subjected to experimental testing, experimental 
paradigms had to use highly artificial situations (e.g. tachistoscopes), and were 
therefore devoid of a great deal of information that is provided in natural, 
ecological settings (the settings in which our perceptual systems evolved and 
normally function). In these experiments, subjects are typically instructed to stay 
still and to fixate on a single point or on several isolated points at a time, or on 
11 See e.g. STEVENSEN, BOAKES [2004]. For philosophical discussion, see SPENCE, 
AUVRAY, SMITH [2015]. 
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7 WOLF, KLUENDER, LEVI [2012],Chapter 15. 
8 See CRUZ, GREEN [2000]. 
9 See e.g. WINTERMANN [2012]. 
10 WOLF, KLUENDER, LEVI [2012]. 
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These different kinds of information work together to tell us about what foods 
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11 See e.g. STEVENSEN, BOAKES [2004]. For philosophical discussion, see SPENCE, 
AUVRAY, SMITH [2015]. 
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a simple object. As a result, psychologists came to believe that the information 
we receive from the retina is insufficient to specify visual features such as multi-
dimensional shape and depth. Rather, what the visual system directly receives 
are “clues” or “cues” (e.g. pictorial depth cues) that perceptual processing then 
uses to interpret and re-construct the visual scene. Gibson held that psychology 
designed its experiments this way in part because it assumed that perception is in 
the business of taking snapshots of the world. Rejecting this picture of 
perception, Gibson (and others including Elanor Gibson, Anne Pick, and Egon 
Brunswik) found ways to perform experiments in natural, ecological settings.12
And in these settings, it seemed there was no need to mentally augment the 
incoming visual information.13
Gibson’s radical view was that there’s enough visual information available in the 
ambient array of reflected light for most tasks, so there is no need to construct 
mental representations of the world.  This information is only available in 
a natural environment (for instance, the texture of the ground or floor is very 
important, as is the horizon) and the information is picked up by an organism as 
the organism moves about in that environment.  
We will now move onto some examples: 
J. J. Gibson served in WWII as a director of a unit for the U.S. Army Air Force’s 
Aviation Psychology program.14 One of the fruits of his research in the Air Force 
was the discovery of Optic Flow. Optic flow is the pattern of change in the 
structure of visible light caused by the relative motion between an observer and 
an environment. It’s these changes in the optic array that allow us to perceive 
invariants – structures that are resistant to the change brought about by our 
movement – and the invariants constitute the information about the environment 
that we need, e.g. when a pilot is coming in for a landing, the shape and location 
of the landing is specified by the invariant structures in the optic flow, and 
velocity with which the vessel is moving towards the landing will be specified 
by the rate and direction of the flow
In the next section we will discuss other ways in which activity may contribute 
to what is perceived.  
Gustation perhaps provides more obvious examples of the crucial role activity 
plays in information pick-up. According to the oyster chefs interviewed by Bon 
Apetit’s “How to Eat (and Taste) an Oyster,” looking, smelling, and chewing is 
essential to detecting an oyster’s true flavor. Similarly, as you’ll learn at any 
wine tasting, a tasting ritual consists in: sip, air intake, and swish around in the 
mouth (especially the back of the mouth), followed by swallow or spit. Here we 
12 GIBSON [1969] and [1991] GIBSON, PICK [2000], BRUNSWIK [1934], [1943], and [1947].
13 GIBSON [1986], Chapter 9.  
14 REED [1988]. 
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will discuss several of the many ways in which activities are essential to 
extracting information in gustation.
Gordon Shepherd, a professor of neurobiology, has devised a nice procedure for 
demonstrating how multi-modal taste perception is. He calls it the “nose-pinch 
test.”15 Here it is: hold your nose tightly and take a sip of your coffee and swish 
it around in your mouth, or pop a mint or piece of gum into your mouth and 
chew it. While holding your nose, you’ll taste very little – depending on what 
the substance is, you’ll get sweet, salty, bitter, sour, and maybe some burning or 
tingling. This is because the information you’re extracting is limited to what the 
taste buds on your tongue and the roof of your mouth can extract. But then let go 
of your nose and breathe in. You’ll experience a wave of coffee or mint flavor. 
Shepherd’s test highlights the role of retronasal olfaction in extracting 
information about the food or drink we are eating. Retronasal olfaction is the 
nasal passage that connects up with the back of your mouth. Of course, as wine 
and scotch drinkers know well, retronasal olfaction is only part of the story. 
Orthonasal olfaction, specifically, active sniffing, extracts yet further 
information about the substance you’re about to consume, or considering 
consuming. 
When discussing Shepherd’s test, we mentioned that while you were holding 
your nose, you might experience some burn or tingle, depending on the 
substance. For instance, if you’re eating chili pepper, horseradish, or mint. Or 
perhaps you’re experiencing the delectable viscosity of some buttery or creamy 
dessert. The trigeminal nerve (touch) contributes these features of experience.  
The ears also extract information concerning the texture of the food we eat, as 
mentioned above. 
These are just a few examples of the many ways different sensory modalities are 
involved in flavor experience. And notice that activity is involved in all of this 
– chewing, breathing, swallowing, etc. It may be that, as Matthew Fulkerson
(2014) argues, the distinct receptors involved in touch (somatosensation) work 
together in the activities involved picking up information about objects resulting 
in a unified phenomenology of touch. We suggest that these activities which 
structure the act of eating may help explain the unified phenomenology of 
flavor.16 For instance, the fact that when eating pretzels the experience is as of 
a smooth, crunchy, salty object located in the mouth, and not discrete sensations 
from each of the involved modalities (ears, tongue, mouth, etc.).
15 SHEPHERD [2012].  
16 FULKERSON [2014]. 
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1.3. Activity structures perceptual experience (form) 
We have discussed the ways in which perception can be thought of as being for 
action (activity) and the ways in which activity can be thought to be important 
for perception. In this section, we discuss the ways in which activity figures into 
what is perceived. 
On a traditional picture, activity simply doesn’t figure into the content of what’s 
perceived. Perception may be for action, and the functions of our perceptual 
systems, which on some traditional pictures play a role in determining content, 
may be related to behavior/activity on the part of the organism, but the 
behavior/activity has no place in the content itself.  
One version of this static view is known as the “snapshot” theory of perception. 
According to this theory, (visual) perception is like a fast-acting camera, taking 
snapshot after snapshot, and then mentally stringing the snapshots together to 
form coherent scenes through space and time. As we move around in the world, 
it’s just as if you are taking photographs from different angles or positions 
within the world, now of this object, now of that. Perception is just a series of 
static, momentary states. 
Against this, Gibson asserted that perception is an event: it persists through time, 
it has duration. And one perceives the world not by standing still and snapping 
a perceptual picture, but by moving about in and acting on the world – e.g., 
walking around objects. Such activity is necessary to create access to 
information in the structure of the optic array. As Gibson explains: 
The optic array changes, of course, as the point of observation moves. But it 
also does not change, not completely. Some features of the array do not persist 
and some do. The changes come from locomotion, and the nonchanges come 
from the rigid layout of the environmental surfaces. Hence, the nonchanges 
specify the layout and count as information about it; the changes specify 
locomotion and count as another kind of information, about the locomotion 
itself. (73)17
Gibson distinguished between two kinds of structure in the optic array: invariant 
structure and perspective structure. Perspective structure “changes with every 
displacement of the point of observation – the shorter the displacement, the 
smaller the change, the longer the displacement, the larger the change.” (73) 
The invariant structure remains the same regardless of motions of the observer 
and thus “separates off best when the frozen perspective structure begins to 
flow.” Further, information from invariants (about surfaces in environment) 
implies information about perspective (position, locomotion), and vice versa. 
17 GIBSON [1986].
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For instance, objects uniformly “growing” or “shrinking” as an observer moves 
towards or away from them is an example of an optical flow invariant, as the 
array will always transform like this under those changes.
It’s not that the information merely takes movement to be revealed, as if the 
movement were just needed to pull the curtain, making way for the perceptual 
systems to take a picture. Instead the act of moving, the dynamic inter-activity 
between the perceiver and the world, necessarily go together. As Gibson 
explains: 
The geometrical habit of separating space from time and imagining sets of 
frozen forms in space is very strong. One can think of each point in the medium 
as stationary, and distinct to each such point there would correspond a unique 
optic array. The set of all points…and optic arrays is the whole of the available 
information about the layout…This is an elegant and abstract way of thinking, 
modeled on projective geometry. But it does not allow for the complexities of 
optical change and does not do justice to the fact that the optic array flows in 
time instead of going from one structure to another.  What we need for the 
formulation of ecological optics are not the traditional notions of space and time 
but the concepts of variance and invariance considered as reciprocal to one 
another. (74 ibid) 
It is important to realize that the flowing perspective structure and the 
underlying invariant structure are concurrent. They exist at the same time. 
Although they specify different things, locomotion through a rigid world in the 
first instance and the layout of that rigid world in the second instance, they are 
like the two sides of a coin, for each implies the other…there is nothing illogical 
about the idea of concurrent specification of two reciprocal things. (76 ibid.) 
The environment seen-at-this-moment does not constitute the environment as it 
is seen. (195 ibid.) 
Another way in which Gibson thought activity alters the very content of 
experience is in what he thought the content of experience was. Some traditional 
notions of perceptual or experiential content tend to be relatively thin. 
Organisms perceive colors, shapes, properties, and objects, e.g. the green leaves 
of a tree. But they do not see the leaves as leaves, or the tree as a tree, where this 
requires applications of concepts that only adult humans possess. 
Gibson, in contrast, has a richer notion of the content (which he understood to be 
non-representational, though given the many different things “representation” 
might mean one must be cautious before assuming to know what he meant by 
this). According to Gibson, what organisms perceive are not, or at least not 
merely, objects and properties, but affordances; an affordance is what some 
object or situation allows an organism to do or not do, for example, a sharp drop 
in the plane on which the organism is moving affords falling (this situation is 
experimentally simulated by a visual cliff). The point is that seeing for Gibson 
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is seeing as, where the “as” is construed as information relevant to possible 
behaviors for the organism, and these possibilities need not require the capacity 
for high-level conceptual (or linguistic) thinking. Creatures see the world as 
opportunities for behavior or as meaning or entailing bodily consequences.  
We have just suggested that activity determines content in terms of its duration, 
dynamic as opposed to static, and in terms of what the content means for the 
organism – affordances as opposed to subject-independent descriptions of 
objects and properties. Other philosophers of broadly Gibsonian, pragmatist, or 
phenomenological leanings have posited further roles for activity in determining 
and even constituting content.  
For instance, Alva Noё (2004) has argued that organisms gain a kind of 
knowledge-how, a knowledge or expectation of sensori-motor contingencies by 
actively moving around in and exploring their environments.18 According to 
Noё, to perceive an object such as an apple as having volume, one must bring 
to bear sensori-motor knowledge, e.g. grasping, about objects of that kind, 
Another claim Noё makes is about occlusion and a-modal completion. 
Organisms are able to perceive objects and shapes as the whole objects and 
shapes they are even when they are partially occluded. Noё borrows Gibson’s 
example of seeing a cat partially occluded by the rails of a picket fence. We 
perceive the cat as whole even though we are only directly visually confronted 
with cat slices. Saccadic eye movements are necessary to take in whole scenes or 
object, so even wholeness of object requires activity, which for Noё is largely 
proprioceptive. So for Noё, my visual perception as of a full object or scene 
includes in its content a kind of proprioceptive readiness to explore, via 
saccades, the visual scene, thereby making available information that is not 
currently visually available or presented.
We are not arguing in favor of Noё’s views. In fact, we want to emphasize 
Gibson’s notion of reciprocity in perception: every experience of the world also 
gives us egocentric proprioceptive information. It’s not just that proprioception 
informs vision, vision informs proprioception. We thus reject views that attempt 
or seem to attempt to make proprioception more basic than vision. However, we 
do think Noё highlights a potentially important feature about the content of 
perception that we are inclined to endorse, i.e., that content is sometimes, or 
perhaps even often, multi-modal, and multi-modality requires and implies 
potential activity. Sensori-motor content is about seeing and expectations of how 
we might act. Noё is right that the senses that carry information about an 
organism’s motor activity are somatosensory (e.g. muscle spindles), 
proprioceptive, and vestibular, but also, at times, visual. 
18 NOË [2004]. We are aware that expectation plays a role in many theories of perception and 
knowledge, e.g. the perceptual schemata of Julian Hochberg [1964], Roger Shank’s [1990] scripts.
PERCEIVING AND KNOWING AS ACTIVITIES 55
A fairly simple example of the way in which visual content relies on and may be 
thought to include proprioceptive information is in detecting movement. 
Movement of light across the retina can either be caused by the movements of 
the eye or the movements of a light reflecting object. To perceive an object 
moving, the visual system must distinguish an object’s movement from the eyes’ 
movement. Some theories hold that proprioceptive information is merely used in 
the computations that result in the perception as of a moving object. However, 
it’s also possible part of the content of our awareness is that the perceived 
movement is not ocular or bodily movement. To wit, the content might be 
“moving object” or it might be “movement not from the perceiver” which entails 
that the movement is of something external. As should be clear, we endorse 
something along the lines of the latter interpretation of the content.  
Another way in which visual content may be thought to be multi-modal is in the 
perception of visual texture and hardness. When a surface is represented as 
rough, this is different from representing a surface as smooth or merely patterned 
in a certain way. This information is important to how we attempt to interact 
with the object – for instance, how we should walk on that surface. Visual 
roughness seems to have direct tactile significance. The incorporation of tactical 
content in visual experience parallels the modal integration of information 
characteristic of flavor experience discussed above.  
2. Knowing
As noted in the introduction, most epistemic theories, notably empiricism, hold 
that our knowledge of the world somehow derives from the content of our 
perceptions of the world. An active view of perception and knowledge does not 
deny this.  
Rather, the active theory of perception holds that we get knowledge from 
perceiving, but often it is knowledge about how to act. (And so it is knowledge 
not in propositional form). It is, also, information about the layout of the world. 
In this way active perceiving is the basis for active knowing.  How and why 
knowing is active may be explained in many ways. 
Perhaps, the easiest way to conceive of the active nature of knowing is to 
contrast it with a passive view (as we saw earlier in perception). A passive state 
theory holds that knowledge consists in holding true beliefs, where holding or 
entertaining a belief is just for a person or mind to be in a stable relation to a 
proposition. This makes all knowledge propositional knowledge. 
Peter Machamer and Alison Springle 54
is seeing as, where the “as” is construed as information relevant to possible 
behaviors for the organism, and these possibilities need not require the capacity 
for high-level conceptual (or linguistic) thinking. Creatures see the world as 
opportunities for behavior or as meaning or entailing bodily consequences.  
We have just suggested that activity determines content in terms of its duration, 
dynamic as opposed to static, and in terms of what the content means for the 
organism – affordances as opposed to subject-independent descriptions of 
objects and properties. Other philosophers of broadly Gibsonian, pragmatist, or 
phenomenological leanings have posited further roles for activity in determining 
and even constituting content.  
For instance, Alva Noё (2004) has argued that organisms gain a kind of 
knowledge-how, a knowledge or expectation of sensori-motor contingencies by 
actively moving around in and exploring their environments.18 According to 
Noё, to perceive an object such as an apple as having volume, one must bring 
to bear sensori-motor knowledge, e.g. grasping, about objects of that kind, 
Another claim Noё makes is about occlusion and a-modal completion. 
Organisms are able to perceive objects and shapes as the whole objects and 
shapes they are even when they are partially occluded. Noё borrows Gibson’s 
example of seeing a cat partially occluded by the rails of a picket fence. We 
perceive the cat as whole even though we are only directly visually confronted 
with cat slices. Saccadic eye movements are necessary to take in whole scenes or 
object, so even wholeness of object requires activity, which for Noё is largely 
proprioceptive. So for Noё, my visual perception as of a full object or scene 
includes in its content a kind of proprioceptive readiness to explore, via 
saccades, the visual scene, thereby making available information that is not 
currently visually available or presented.
We are not arguing in favor of Noё’s views. In fact, we want to emphasize 
Gibson’s notion of reciprocity in perception: every experience of the world also 
gives us egocentric proprioceptive information. It’s not just that proprioception 
informs vision, vision informs proprioception. We thus reject views that attempt 
or seem to attempt to make proprioception more basic than vision. However, we 
do think Noё highlights a potentially important feature about the content of 
perception that we are inclined to endorse, i.e., that content is sometimes, or 
perhaps even often, multi-modal, and multi-modality requires and implies 
potential activity. Sensori-motor content is about seeing and expectations of how 
we might act. Noё is right that the senses that carry information about an 
organism’s motor activity are somatosensory (e.g. muscle spindles), 
proprioceptive, and vestibular, but also, at times, visual. 
18 NOË [2004]. We are aware that expectation plays a role in many theories of perception and 
knowledge, e.g. the perceptual schemata of Julian Hochberg [1964], Roger Shank’s [1990] scripts.
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A fairly simple example of the way in which visual content relies on and may be 
thought to include proprioceptive information is in detecting movement. 
Movement of light across the retina can either be caused by the movements of 
the eye or the movements of a light reflecting object. To perceive an object 
moving, the visual system must distinguish an object’s movement from the eyes’ 
movement. Some theories hold that proprioceptive information is merely used in 
the computations that result in the perception as of a moving object. However, 
it’s also possible part of the content of our awareness is that the perceived 
movement is not ocular or bodily movement. To wit, the content might be 
“moving object” or it might be “movement not from the perceiver” which entails 
that the movement is of something external. As should be clear, we endorse 
something along the lines of the latter interpretation of the content.  
Another way in which visual content may be thought to be multi-modal is in the 
perception of visual texture and hardness. When a surface is represented as 
rough, this is different from representing a surface as smooth or merely patterned 
in a certain way. This information is important to how we attempt to interact 
with the object – for instance, how we should walk on that surface. Visual 
roughness seems to have direct tactile significance. The incorporation of tactical 
content in visual experience parallels the modal integration of information 
characteristic of flavor experience discussed above.  
2. Knowing
As noted in the introduction, most epistemic theories, notably empiricism, hold 
that our knowledge of the world somehow derives from the content of our 
perceptions of the world. An active view of perception and knowledge does not 
deny this.  
Rather, the active theory of perception holds that we get knowledge from 
perceiving, but often it is knowledge about how to act. (And so it is knowledge 
not in propositional form). It is, also, information about the layout of the world. 
In this way active perceiving is the basis for active knowing.  How and why 
knowing is active may be explained in many ways. 
Perhaps, the easiest way to conceive of the active nature of knowing is to 
contrast it with a passive view (as we saw earlier in perception). A passive state 
theory holds that knowledge consists in holding true beliefs, where holding or 
entertaining a belief is just for a person or mind to be in a stable relation to a 
proposition. This makes all knowledge propositional knowledge. 
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Now, commonly memory psychologists distinguish different kinds of memory.  
The memory system encoding propositions is called declarative or semantic 
memory, but then they add other memory systems, i.e. episodic memory, which 
is the system that encodes episodes in a person’s life so there is always 
a reference to the person’s ego or self, and finally, there is procedural memory, 
which is knowing how to do something. The first two systems are often 
conceived as having propositional content. 
A few philosophers, e.g. Jason Stanley (2011), believe and try to argue that even 
knowing how is propositional, but we won’t enter this dispute here.
But let’s think about thinking (as John Dewey might say).  When we think we 
seldom confine ourselves to one sentence-like thought, even if we think in 
words. Our thinking often races from thought to thought, drawing inferences, 
solving problems or constructing fantasies. That is, we actively use our 
knowledge when planning to do something.  
So, e.g. when we move to get information about the shape and distance of an 
object, it might well be that we obtain this information or knowledge in order to 
grasp or lay hold of an object. Or, e.g., use the knowledge gained from the 
seeing of an object coming toward us to avoid collision with that object.19
But there are other less obvious ways to think about the active character of 
knowing: Most generally, knowing is an adaptation of humans interacting with 
their environment. And a person can come to know something more or less well. 
Knowing is not an all or nothing condition. We have to do things to gain more 
knowledge. Obviously learning and gaining knowledge is an active process. 
But more about the active nature of knowing itself. First, a long-standing, fairly 
popular analytic tradition holds that knowledge is justified true belief. Now an 
influential group of philosophers hold the position that justification is comprised 
by the giving of reasons.  And reasons must be made explicit and public by 
language. These arguments that follow should not be confused with any form of 
linguistic behaviorism (even in a Wittgensteinian or Rylian form). 
Yet another argument for the active nature of knowledge is that for any 
knowledge to be meaningful, it must be put to use, or, phrased differently, 
knowing must have consequences or effects, for the knower and/or for others. 
This would be to conceive of knowledge as dispositional.  It must be capable of 
being actualized to count as knowledge. Actualization or consequences may 
come in many ways, e.g. as answers to questions, as bases for inferences, or as 
steps in problem solving, or even as constructing content for daydreams or 
fantasies by thinking. 
19 See SCHIFF, DETWILER [1979]. 
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HOW TO DEFINE THE NOTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
WHICH SOLVES THE GETTIER PROBLEM 
Abstract. Our contention is that to solve the Gettier Problem, a notion of infallible knowledge 
involving the substantial truth theory is necessary. We assume that acts of sense experience have 
propositional content, and that atomic empirical propositions need the existence of non-mental 
objects to be true. This approach allows for making the distinction between epistemically good 
justifiers and ontologically good justifiers, and leads to a definition of propositional  empirical 
knowledge free of the Gettier Problem. Our explication of the Gettier Problem rejects 
Hetherington’s (2012) view that the Gettier Problem rests on jointly unsatisfiable constraints, 
sheds a new light on Floridi’s (2004) result, avoids the Pyrrhonian skepticism, as well as the 
skepticism defended by Kirkham (1984), and vindicates the substantial notion of truth. 
Keywords. Evidence, truth, knowledge, fallibilism, infallibilism, Gettier Problem. 
1. What is the Gettier Problem?
Gettier ([1963]) poses the question: What do we mean when we say that 
someone knows something, for example, that Smith knows that Jones owns a 
Ford? Although the Gettier type counterexamples have been familiar since the 
time Gettier’s paper was published, the Gettier Problem is not recognized in the 
same way by those who deal with it. Kirkham ([1984]) defines the Gettier 
Problem as a problem which rests on a mistaken assumption. This mistaken 
assumption consists in the attempt to find such an explication of knowledge 
which  
(i) includes all or most of the beliefs we commonly regard as 
knowledge, and 
(ii) excludes any belief which the subject does not know on that
explication, that is, is immune to all Gettier type counterexamples.  
Kirkham concludes that there is no explication which fulfills both conditions 
(i) and (ii). He argues that to get the weakest explication of “a knows that p”, 
which is immune to all Gettier type counterexamples, we must accept the 
following explication of knowledge: (1) p is true; (2) the subject believes that p; 
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